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Abstract This editorial presents a critical review of the
health model pioneered by Michael Grossman (MGM) in
1972 [8]. It argues that whereas the MGM has great charm
for economists, it fails to achieve acceptance by interested
laypersons and policy makers. The main reasons for this
failure are: (1) the assumption of a long and fixed planning
horizon, (2) a fixed ratio between individuals healthcare
expenditure and the cost of their own health-enhancing
efforts regardless of their state of health, and (3) their
presumed ability to restore the state of health deemed
optimal at a speed that does not depend on their state of
health. An alternative formulation emphasizing the sto-
chastic nature of health production is sketched that con-
ceptually provides solutions to these three problems. In
addition, it permits discarding a popular medical argument
that seems to undermine the very basis of welfare analysis
applied to health by claiming preferences to be unstable:
‘‘As long as you are healthy, you don’t give a damn, but as
soon as you are sick, you are prepared to sacrifice every-
thing to restore your health.’’ The editorial concludes by
outlining a research program that may help health econo-
mists break away from their MGM fixation.
Review of the Grossman model
When it was published in 1972 in the Journal of Political
Economy, Michael Grossmans model (MGM) constituted a
major breakthrough in health economics [8]. However,
the acronym MGM already suggests that the model
amounts to something like the Hollywood dream factory
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer: much elegance, very inspiring, but
of limited relevance to the real world. It also found a
Shake-spearian herald in Adam Wag-staff, who formulated
the MGM as an optimal problem controller and comple-
mented it with simple functional relationships for empirical
testing [17]. The original MGM hypothesis has remained
the same since its beginning. Individuals simultaneously
optimize two assets over their life cycle: health and wealth.
The return to health is nonfinancial, in the guise of healthy
days; it contributes to wealth because additional healthy
time can be used to generate more labor income. Holding a
stock of health entails the usual capital user cost consisting
of depreciation (increasing with age to reflect worsening
health), cost of investment, and change in value (e.g., a
housing asset whose value increases in times of inflation).
The return to wealth is financial, amounting to a rate of
interest. The dynamically optimal path of the two assets
calls for a certain amount of investment both in health
(health-enhancing efforts and medical care, respectively)
and wealth (saving), both being derived demands, as
known in production theory. However, as evidenced in
Wagstaff [17], it is a long way from the basic optimum
condition to an empirically testable formulation.
A first review of the MGM appeared in the inaugural
issue of the Journal of Health Economics [15]. Grossman
provided a comprehensive 30-year review in the Handbook
of Health Economics [9]. In passing, it may be noted that
he devoted more than one page to a somewhat angry rebuff
of the criticisms raised in the textbook by Zweifel and
Breyer, Chap. 3.3 [19] (ZB henceforth); see also Zweifel,
Breyer, and Kifmann, Chap. 3 [20] (ZBK henceforth). It
will come as little surprise that these critical points will be
reiterated below; however, the MGM will be done justice
by first reviewing its theoretical modifications and empir-
ical applications.
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One refinement has been the introduction of uncertainty.
Chang [4] had already recognized that portfolio optimiza-
tion methods could be applied to health as one of several
assets, with risk aversion entering the picture. As risk-
averse individuals typically buy insurance, Liljas [13]
extended MGM to take into account health insurance. As
could be expected, the main implications of MGM
remained unchanged, in particular, the prediction of a
positive relationship between the (permanent, desired)
stock of health and the derived demand for health care. An
important generalization has been provided by researchers
from Lund (Sweden), who by now can be considered the
true MGM believers in Europe. A shortcoming of previous
formulations is that the individual had been considered in
isolation, whereas decision making with regard to health
[and the third asset in question, wisdom (education), one
might note] often occurs within the family. Jacobson [10]
introduced the corresponding combined production possi-
bility frontier, whereas Bolin et al. [2] explored the pos-
sibility of strategic interaction between spouses with the
possibility of one free-riding on the other.
In his empirical test of MGM, Wagstaff [17] noted that
health status was negatively correlated with the demand for
medical care. This constitutes a fundamental contradiction
to the basic MGM hypothesis, which states that health care
is a derived demand with regard to the desired stock of
health. Yet the layperson’s experience is that you see the
doctor when you are sick, implying a negative relationship
between health and health care. However, health stock as
usually measured may not reflect the (permanent, desired)
stock of health as defined in the MGM. Arguably, the most
comprehensive attempt to distil this latent health status
from a cross section of observable indicators was under-
taken by Leu and Doppmann [12] (cited in ZB, Chap. 4.4.1
and ZBK, Chap. 4.4) using Swiss data. However, the
authors did not pursue their project any further, causing
them to be little cited. Their approach was to distinguish
between latent variables (permanent health, permanent
income) and indicators that are all subject to measurement
errors [Linear Structural Relations (LISREL), also known
as Multiple Indicator Multiple Indicator Cause (MIMIC)].
Despite all these efforts, medical inputs (visits to physi-
cians, hospitals, and spas) continued to be negatively
related to latent health, flying in the face of the ‘‘derived-
demand’’ hypothesis of the MGM, according to which
(permanent, i.e. long-run optimal) health stock should be
positively related to inputs (in particular, medical care).
Wagstaff [18] sought to shore up the MGM by introducing
partial adjustment as it is known from macroeconomic
investment functions: investments of a given period bridge
only part of the gap between desired and actual capital
stock, with the speed of adjustment constituting a decision
variable in principle. Wagstaff [18], indeed, finds that
Danes aged [41 years have a lower speed of adjustment
than younger ones. However, the real issue is that this
speed depends crucially on health status; when the gap
between desired and actual health status is wide, failure to
cover it quickly entails high opportunity cost (just think of
being rushed to the nearest hospital with sirens on).
Moreover, in Wagstaff [18], the LISREL estimates in
fact contradict the MGM. Whereas outpatient visits
(OUTPAT) serve as the benchmark indicator of investment
in the previous period It-1, with a coefficient of ?1.00,
other indicators of It-1, such as general practitioner (GP)
visits and hospital days (sic!) have significantly negative
coefficients among those \41 years. Most crucially,
according to the partial adjustment model of investment,
It-1 should be positively related to inherited health stock
Ht-1,at least among the elderly, whose speed of adjustment
likely is lower than the rate of depreciation on Ht-1 (see
Eq. 10 in [18]). However, consider the two findings below
for the older part of the sample (which hold true with
minimal changes for the younger as well),
1. Ht is positively related to Ht-1 with coeff. = 0.849
(t = 16);
2. Ht-1 is negatively related to It-1 (indicated mainly by
OUTPAT) with coeff. = -0.253 (t = -4.7).
Logically, this implies
3. Ht is negatively related to It-1, and in view of (1), Ht-1
is negatively correlated with It-1 as well, i.e., better
health goes along with less, not more, investment and
hence medical care.
Therefore, introducing lags and partial investment fails
to remedy the crucial shortcoming of MGM, i.e., the neg-
ative correlation between health status and medical care. It
is amazing that neither the reviewers nor the editors of
Health Economics recognized this. Or was there collusion
between the journal and the author, serving their shared
interest in keeping the MGM bandwagon rolling? Honni
soit qui mal y pense…
This author pleads guilty of joining the MGM band-
wagon, too (thank heaven in a little-cited piece [16]!). The
panel data analyzed consisted of Swiss health insurance
records complemented by subjective health status and
socioeconomic characteristics measured in 1989 and 1992
(sample I, N = 477) and in 1981 and 1992 (sample II,
N = 212). In sample I, Tobit estimates indicate that health
care expenditure (HCE) if at all decreases with subjective
health (coeff. = -0.206, s.e. = 0.518) when age is con-
trolled for, whereas in the very long-run sample II, it does
increase (coeff. = 0.933, s.e. = 0.413). Three educational
indicators (vocational, college, university), while having
the predicted negative sign in four out of six cases
(reflecting increased individual productivity permitting less
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reliance on medical care) consistently fall (far) short of
statistical significance. Despite these contradictions, the
conclusion reads: ‘‘the use of panel data … combined with
accounting for the distributional peculiarities characteriz-
ing the demand for medical care … permit a much more
successful (italics added) testing of the Grossman model
than was hitherto possible’’.
In sum, even after 40 years of effort, the main criticisms
of the MGM still stand:
1. A long planning horizon of fixed length: Dynamic
optimization makes sense only if it extends over several
periods. Long planning horizons undoubtedly apply
when it comes to assessing wealth and wisdom (skills,
augmented by education). In the case of health, the
MGM view is close to untenable. Just about everyone
has experienced a spell of very bad health, causing his
or her planning horizon to shrink to days or even
minutes (when the rescue vehicle after an accident
rushes the injured to the nearest hospital). The MGM
denies the inherently stochastic nature of health as the
outcome of a production process. And, indeed, there is
incidental evidence supporting this criticism. Although
Benitez-Silva and Ni [1] pay lip service to MGM (as do
many), they find that among 38 % of their respondents,
variations in expected longevity (derived from the
longitudinal US Health and Retirement Study, presum-
ably an excellent indicator of changes in permanently
desired health stock) fail to accord with changes in self-
reported health status. But of course, the authors do not
point to the contradiction with MGM but conclude,
‘‘These potentially serious problems raise doubts
regarding the use and interpretation of the computed
health changes …. Our empirical results suggest that
self-reported health changes are a preferred measure of
health dynamics.’’ Yet, this advice had already been
followed by Nocera and Zweifel [16] but with limited
success (see above).
2. A fixed ratio between individuals HCE and the cost of
their own health-enhancing efforts in the production of
health: Admittedly, this is not part of the core dynamic
optimum condition. However, in their attempt at
deriving testable implications, authors have used the
Cobb-Douglas production function, following the lead
of Wagstaff [17]. This type of production function has
been discarded in general production theory mainly
because it imposes a unitary elasticity of substitution.
Given optimization, this implies that the optimal ratio
of expenditure on two inputs is equal to the ratio of their
exponents in the Cobb-Douglas function ([14],
Chap. 3.D). In the present context, individuals are
predicted to incur HCE and bear the cost of their own
health-enhancing efforts in a fixed proportion because
the exponents of the Cobb-Douglas function are
exogenously given. However, only economists are
willing to accept the implication stating that bad health
leaves HCE relative to the cost of ones own effort
unaffected. In the advent of sickness, any layperson
would expect medical care to become the crucial input,
pretty much replacing patients own efforts. Galama and
Kapteyn [6] address this issue at least indirectly. They
introduce a threshold value beyond which extra medical
care is counterproductive, causing relative productivi-
ties to become state dependent. Even Bolin and
Lindgren [3] recently left the path of true MGM
believers by admitting deviations from the optimal level
of the individuals preventive efforts that go along with
worsened health. They study the ‘‘implications for
equilibrium and stability’’—issues that do not sit well
with the MGM.
3. Ability to restore the state of health deemed optimal
under all circumstances: Taking this literally, one
would have to ask why individuals die at all—unless,
of course, they suddenly view a zero stock of health
optimal. Attempts at suicide reflect such a view. Now
Grossman et al. [7] (Grossman the pediatrician this
time), examining suicidal attempts among young
Navajo Indians, find that a family history of such
attempts is associated with an odds ratio of\2.3; i.e., it
makes attempted suicide an estimated 2.3-fold more
likely ceteris paribus. Apparently, strategic interactions
within the family as the producer of health—the MGM
extension by Bolin et al. [2]—often result in a zero-
health Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Corman
and Grossman [5] (Grossman the economist again this
time) investigated cases in which strategic interactions
(at least among accountable individuals) are not pos-
sible. They found that the availability of abortion serves
to decrease neonatal mortality rates in the United States.
This can be interpreted as parents reducing the health
stock of unwanted children to zero within a few months
(so much for immediate adjustment to the desired stock
of health!). It may also be of interest to note that the
MGM is not alluded to in that article at all.
An alternative formulation: stochastics and state
dependence
Already in ZB, Chap. 3.4 (but see also ZBK, Chap. 3.4) an
alternative to the MGM was proposed. Here, individuals
are much less the masters of their fate than in the MGM
world. Being inserted in a stochastic process consisting of a
string of healthy and sick days, all they have is a (small)
influence on the probability of being sick (p) the following
The Grossman model 679
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day. If currently healthy, they can exert preventive effort
costing their time to increase the probability of being
healthy tomorrow (1-p). If currently sick, they have to
rely on medical care to achieve this. Therefore, both their
consumption possibilities (C) and (1-p) become state
dependent. Individuals are assumed to value consumption
(which requires goods and time as inputs) and chances of
being healthy tomorrow, whereas medical care does not
have utility itself.
In the longer term (weeks, up to a year, say), the binary
distribution determines expected waiting time until there is
a change from healthy to sick. This waiting time is given
by 1/p. Therefore, given decreasing marginal returns, there
is a critical value for time spent on prevention beyond
which p does not decrease sufficiently anymore to generate
net healthy time. One therefore obtains the well-known
bell-shaped boundary of production possibilities shown in
Fig. 1. It is representative of the overall population because
the majority of people currently are in good health (not-
withstanding the medical adage: ‘‘a healthy person is one
that has not been diagnosed enough’’).
Juxtaposing this frontier with indifference curves (stee-
ply sloped to reflect the importance of health) already has
an important implication. At least in countries in which
citizens are not rationed in their access to healthcare ser-
vices, health is never an investment good but always a
consumption good. The optimum of Fig. 1 cannot lie on
the increasing portion of the frontier, where more invest-
ment in health also permits to increase consumption.
Rather, it necessarily lies beyond the peak, indicating a
trade-off between health and consumption. This insight
also casts doubt on the relevance of the popular pure
investment variant of the MGM.
State dependence can come in on the preference and/or
the constraint side. Economists usually cling to the
constraint side, arguing that state-dependent preferences
can be used to explain practically anything, which would
rob microeconomics of its empirical content. Interestingly,
health economists tend to accept their doctors thinly veiled
criticism, ‘‘As long as you are healthy, you don’t give a
damn; but as soon as you are sick, you are prepared to
sacrifice everything to restore your health.’’ This is nothing
but a claim suggesting that when it comes to health, indi-
vidual preferences are unstable—which, of course, pre-
cludes a welfare judgment on anything medical because the
ex-ante valuation of a healthy person will always be
incompatible with the ex-post valuation of the same person
as a patient. In the ZB/ZBK model, state dependence enters
on the production side, and in two ways:
1. When healthy, individuals are more productive both in
terms of C and (1-p). As to consumption possibilities,
the labor income earned through work is assumed to
outweigh the fact that part of the available time is
devoted to work. And individuals can always sacrifice
consumption possibilities in favor of prevention to
come rather close to the limit of 365 healthy days a
year if they so desire.
2. When sick, individuals receive an exogenous income
in the guise of social security benefits, which is
assumed to be far lower than their regular labor
income. More time could be available for consumption
because there is no need to go to work. However, this
must be balanced against time spent on travelling to
see the physician, waiting in the practice, and recov-
ering (especially when in hospital).
In the whole, Fig. 2 indicates that consumption possi-
bilities shrink in both dimensions when the individual falls
ill.
It contains two additional assumptions:
Fig. 1 Production possibilities and preference for health chances
Fig. 2 State dependence in the production of consumption and
healthy time
680 P. Zweifel
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A1 The loss of productive capabilities is more marked in
terms of health (healthy days) than in terms of consumption
services.
A2 Preferences are homothetic (otherwise, no definite
predictions are possible).
With A1 and A2 in hand, it can be easily shown that
individuals behave in a way as though health (and hence
medical care) is more important to them when sick rather
than healthy, although their preferences are not state
dependent. To see this, consider optimum Q* in the state
healthy. Along the ray through the origin, indifference
curves have the same slope due to homotheticity. However,
in view of assumption A1, the production possibility
frontier in the sick state has steeper slope almost every-
where than its counterpart pertaining to the healthy state.
Therefore, the tangency condition for an optimum can only
be satisfied at a point such as Q**, where the tangent runs
steeper than at Q*. However, the slope of this tangent
indicates the relative value of the two goods in question.
Evidently, the relative value of healthy days is higher in the
sick than the healthy state. Therefore, there is no need for
health economists to accept the doctor’s claim that health
preferences are unstable. This is a second insight that the
MGM does not provide.
Admittedly, these advantages come at a price. First, the
ZB/ZBK model is black and white because it contains only
two states of health. Contrary to the continuous health
stock in the MGM, generalizing to more than two states is
by no means easy. Second, in the healthy state, demand for
medical care is simply zero. In this regard, Galama and
Kaptain [6], with their limit value, are more flexible
(although specifying the limit where medical care does not
contribute to health anymore may be difficult). But then,
the ZB/ZBK formulation is certainly more palatable to
interested laypersons and policy makers because of its
message: ‘‘As long as I am healthy, I can do something to
maintain my health; but as soon as I fall ill, I have to rely
on the doctor.’’
Suggestions for future research
The ZB/ZBK model also points toward possibilities for
fruitful future research. One is the substitutability of an
individual’s own preventive effort by medical care. Having
only one input in a given state of health, the ZB/ZBK
health production function seems to exclude substitutabil-
ity. However, the more preventive effort in the healthy
state, the higher (1/p), hence the longer on expectation the
duration of the healthy state during which no health care
services are required. Conversely, more medical care
restores good health quicker, resulting in a longer string of
healthy days, As noted by Zweifel and Manning [21], there
is preciously little empirical evidence on these
relationships.
Another area of research is the corrective action of
individuals suggested by the ZB/ZBK model. As the
principal target variable is the chance of being healthy
[(1-p*) \1; this is behind Figs. 1, 2], individuals contin-
ually over- and undershoot their target by spending another
healthy day [(1-p) = 1] or another sick day [(1-p) = 0].
In the case of overshooting, one would expect skimping on
preventive effort as the natural response. The prediction
therefore is that the longer the string of healthy days, the
lower preventive effort ceteris paribus.
Finally, modelling the distribution of HCE with its
highly positive third and fourth moments has attracted
much effort recently (see, e.g., [11]). However, this dis-
tribution reflects decisions taken by patients and health care
providers. On the patient side, it should be related to the
stochastic process governing the production of health. The
longer the previous string of healthy days undermining the
incentive for prevention, the greater presumably the degree
of undershooting, calling for quick adjustment and hence
an intensive use of healthcare services and particularly high
HCE (‘‘haste makes waste,’’ as it were). Therefore, the
distribution characteristics of HCE need to be related to the
nature of the stochastic process prior to the advent of
sickness.
As a final remark, this editorial was triggered by a
Scandinavian friend complaining, with an eye on Lund
University: ‘‘The Grossman model has misled a whole
generation of health economists.’’ While this likely
amounts to an overstatement, there is something to be
gained by breaking away from the MGM fixation. If this
editorial should help in this process, it has achieved its
objective.
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